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Global diffusion of the non-traditional banking model and alliance 
networks: Social exposure, learning and moderating regulatory effort 
 
Alexander Cuntz1 & Knut Blind2 (2010) 
 
Abstract. We analyze the impact of (alliance) network exposure on the speed and extent of 
adoption of the business model as being one explanatory factor for diffusion controlling for 
actor specific characteristics and embeddedness in the network. In order to explain how 
existing national regulation moderated this relationship and whether it succeeded in its risk-
limiting mission by moderating global adoption patterns and risk-bearing behavior among 
financial institutions we estimate various history event analysis model i.e. standard Cox and 
extended frailty models. We find strong support for the role of network exposure rather than 
social learning, the impact of regulatory effort on patterns of adoption and the role of 
country clusters for diffusion in the financial sector. 
Keywords.  Diffusion, networks, alliances, banking, regulation, social learning, exposure 
JEL Class.  G11, G15, G21, G28 
 
Introductory note 
Systemicness has been forwarded many times as being one of the influencing factors for the current 
financial crisis. In this context, the overall effect of the subprime mortage crisis on the financial sector 
followed by the downturn of the real economy is assumed to have worsened the situation due to the 
multiple interdependencies of national banking and finance systems on the global level including 
(among others) interbank lending and cross-boarder trading of financial instruments on international 
marketplaces on the one hand, past and present (strategic) alliances and other forms of co-operation 
among banks and financial institutions, on the other.  Most recently, it has been stated in a Science 
special issue on network perspectives that “[..] networks show a high connectivity among financial 
institutions that have mutual share-holdings and closed loops involving several nodes. This indicates 
that the financial sector is strongly interdependent, which may affect market competition and 
systemic risk and make the network vulnerable to instability” (Schweitzer et al., 2009). 
More precisely, the expected excess of risk-bearing behavior that is commonly associated with 
business operations of banks today in the worldwide financial system seems to have its antecendents 
in a subtle change of the traditional customer-loan based banking business model in the last two 
decades (Vitols, 2009; Edwards and Mishkin, 1995). Some US bankers joke that, formerly, success in 
banking used to be based on following the “3-6-3” rule – i.e. taking in deposits from local customers 
at a 3 percent interest rate, charging a 6 percent rate on business and home loans, and being on the 
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golf course by 3 pm. Under this type of business model, understanding bank balance sheets also used 
to be simple, since most liabilities were accounted for by customer deposits and most assets by 
customer loans. Starting in the 1980 and 1990s, however, under the influence of financial 
deregulation and innovation (White, 2000), the traditional model has been transformed; something 
that became observable in a decreasing role of interest-based or loan income share on the bank’s 
financial statement. The following innovative banking operations and financial instruments may 
partially account for this overall change in business model, exemplarily here for the US, even though 
most likely viable across the globe (Clarke, 2010):  
One innovation is a shifting from an “originate to hold” to an “originate to distribute” 
business model i.e. banks make loans with the intention of reselling them to other investors 
rather than holding them to maturity. In the US, the first securitization of consumer loans 
occurred in 1985 and of credit card receivables in 1987. US Federal Reserve Board statistics 
show that by 2008 the amount of loans as a percentage of assets at the ten largest US banks 
decreased to 51 percent. A second trend is the larger involvement of banks as short-term 
traders of various types of financial products, including the establishment of large 
departments specialized in trading activities. The percent of assets held for trading by the 
largest ten banks in the US increased from about 4 percent in the mid-1980s to 12 percent of 
the assets currently. A third innovation is the bank’s engagement in more complex financial 
products. In particular, the amount of derivatives held by US banks has exploded over the past 
decade and a half, from a notional amount of less than $ 100 billion in 1994 (when reporting 
requirements on the value of derivatives were imposed on banks) to more than $ 8 trillion at 
the end of 2008. A fourth development is the increasing use of funding sources other than 
“core deposits” from the traditional customer base, including the wholesale commercial 
paper market, loans from other banks, and repurchase agreements on securities. These 
“managed liabilities” are now almost as important as core deposits, now accounting for 41 
percent of the funding for US banks (Vitols, 2009). 
 
Interestingly, adoption of such an innovative business model poses large operational risk on banks – 
not only in terms of short-term expected profitability of such a model but as well in terms of the 
long-term content of the business model itself, potentially harming stability of national and 
international financial systems. As financial innovations embedded in this business model are most 
frequently of private origin having strong, both, positive and negative externalities for the financial 
system –in contrast to pure public good character of scientific innovation – they potentially serve as 
an impetus to growth but were mostly followed by crisis in the last two decades (Boyer, 2010)i. 
Hence, understanding further what factors have shaped the diffusion of this banking business model 
should be a central concern of policy-makers on national and supranational level and bank managers 
in order to adjust regulatory effort associated to risk-bearing of banking institutions as well as to 
assess the long-term effects of future pioneering behavior of banks and expected diffusion patterns. 
In this way, it seems valuable to identify and differentiate the drivers that motivated banks to adopt 
this type of business model. 
The traditional literature on diffusion of innovation mostly suggests that decisions on adoption either 
stem from specific characteristics of adopters, e.g. risk averseness, and internal feedback 
mechanisms from prior to future adopters, or elsewise may stem from changes in external factors 
such as prices or quality changes i.e. changing framework conditions of an overall system. Young 
(2009) identifies three broader classes of diffusion models that include such internal feedback 
mechanisms - drawn from the literature on marketing, sociology and economics -, i) contagion, ii) 
social influence and iii) social learning, respectively. He summarizes that while social learning models 
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have decision-theoretic roots and are, hence, most plausible from an economics standpoint as 
adopters use information rationally gathered by prior adopters, models of contagion as well as social 
influence bear the notion of exposure rather than utility maximization. Anyhow, none of the above 
models must suffice as a sole explanatory concept for diffusion i.e. we do not postulate that bank 
adoption is due to either herding behavior or rational choice.  
Nevertheless, this categorization of diffusion models only applies to situations where there is 
informational feedback between members of a group who interact more or less at random. If 
information flows run through a fixed network of strategic alliances, say in this context between 
banks which are near neighbors (in a social, strategic or geographical sense), then clearly a network-
based analysis is needed that accounts for the effects of peers, embeddedness in the network and 
overall network structure on bank’s adoption decisions. In our context, financial networks of 
strategic alliances seem to have three generic functions: i) the exchange of information on innovative 
design of business operations, i.e. know-how on the development of financial instruments, and 
forming a organizational learning (or herding) environment on expected profitability of the latter 
(Borgatti and Foster, 2003), as well as ii) offering exclusive demand and supply relations that may 
create submarkets and additional market power for exchange and distribution of such financial 
instrumentsii, and iii) a system level function that (the former being at work on an agent level) 
integrates and synchronizes national financial markets into higher-order (at the extreme, global) 
financial systems. Hence, we are interested in the effect of existing network structures on similarity 
of adoption behavior more than the causality of emergence and the evolution of these structures i.e. 
the primary motivation to form strategic alliances among institutions or variance in actor 
performance due to structure, respectively. 
 
More generally, in contrast to e.g. most literature on social capital where inter-firm links are 
regarded as opportunities in terms of access to financial and intellectual resources creating 
competitive advantage, from a diffusion perspective network ties and network structure arguably put 
constraints on the patterns of adoption and aggregate diffusion (again, Borgatti and Foster, 2003). 
However, it is not self-evident from a scientific standpoint how to define the social environment 
shaping different levels of exposure for network actors. The boundaries of a social group(s) affecting 
individual adoption behavior of banks – at any scale - may consist of a set of direct or indirect ties in 
the network, and / or potentially will depend on the overall system of competitive banks on a 
national or even global level. In order to tackle these structural definition and level-of-analysis 
problems we identify peer groups for the individual bank as being immediate neighbors i.e. direct 
ties in the strategic alliance network, and banking institutions being exposed to (and potentially 
constrained by) an identical national regulatory and similar competitive environment as well as direct 
and indirect effect of neighboring financial systems at country level within and outside the network 
and their respective regulation.  
Even though national regulation aimed at limiting risk-bearing behavior of financial institutions e.g. 
based on compulsory (customer) deposit insurance existed since 1934 (for the US) and emerging 
economies quickly succeeded such regulation, global diffusion of this new type of banking model 
evolved with considerable pace and presumably was not hindered by supranational regulation as 
non-existent or only in its infancy.  Different to the traditional regulatory concept of central banks as 
being lenders of last resort curing financial crises ex post, existing deposit insurance and accounting 
or prudential standards can be seen as an ex ante regulatory instrument to prevent financial 
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instability of institutions and overall systems (Boyer, 2010). In a similar fashion, other ex ante 
regulation currently in the debate such as establishment and strengthening of supervisory 
authorities, restrictions on entry to the profession or certification of new financial instruments may 
reduce the bailing out by Central Banks, and hence, significantly help to reduce economic and social 
costs of crises making financial markets more transparent and stable in the long-run.  
Thus, we seek to understand the impact of (alliance) network exposure on the speed and extent of 
adoption of the business model as being one explanatory factor for diffusion controlling for actor 
specific characteristics and embeddedness in the network. Furthermore, we wish to explain how 
existing national regulation moderated this relationship and whether it succeeded in its risk-limiting 
mission by moderating global adoption patterns and risk-bearing behavior among financial 
institutions. We find strong support for the role of network exposure, the impact of regulatory effort 
on patterns of adoption and the role of country clusters for diffusion in the financial sector.  
The paper structures in the following manner: We begin the next section with a review of the 
relevant literature and development of hypothesis. We then continue with a section describing the 
sample and the data sources we use. The following section illustrates the empirical design and gives 
results. Lastly, we close by discussing improvements and implications for future studies, and 
conclusion. 
 
Literature review and hypothesis 
We begin this section by reviewing the literature on i) business models and innovation, and, ii) 
technology adoption under uncertainty. We continue, more specifically, with empirical and 
theoretical work in the area of iii) diffusion in networks and related studies of strategic alliances, iv) 
financial innovation and diffusion of financial innovation, and lastly, v) regulatory effort in the 
financial sector. This leads us, then, to derive a set of hypothesis on the diffusion effect of network 
exposure and regulation for different levels of the analysis in the context of global diffusion of the 
non-traditional banking business model.   
 
Firstly, one way of thinking about business models is that they provide a set of generic level 
descriptors of how a firm organizes itself to create and distribute value in a profitable manner while 
they tend to incorporate the possibility of innovation (Baden-Fuller and Morgan, 2010). Hence, 
radically changing the business model will potentially change the value of the technology to the 
business model and its resource requirements i.e. these are a variety of strategic elements - 
resources, capabilities, products, customers, technologies, markets and so forth. Nevertheless, one 
should not restrict business model innovation to changes in resources as this may additionally 
require new arrangement of organization and integrative effort of the main elements of the firm’s 
activity. Regarding a reshaping of traditional banking business models iii this process may coincide 
with the establishment of trading and investment departments within banking institutions, customer 
acceptance on new financial products as well as a gathering sufficient experience on these particular 
markets across time depending on the entrepreneurial more than operational capacities of bank 
management (Penrose, 1959). As some authors argue in this line of reasoning, “creating value from 
technology is not simply a matter of managing technical uncertainty; there is significant uncertainty 
in the social domain as well, and in the many possible ways of mapping between the domains 
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(Chesbrough and Rosenbloom, 2002)”. Hence, changes within the resource or competency set may 
subsequently change other elements of the very same component; some value proposition - 
stemming from revenue and cost volume and structures as being an observable first sign of business 
model evolution - may create productive opportunities for further value propositions; and 
modifications in the internal organization or the web of external organizational links as in our 
example of strategic alliances may directly impact other parts of the organizational system. To 
summarize, as in any other industry sector, specific business models in the financial sector function 
like “recipes”: they serve as practical models of technology that are ready for copying (or adoption), 
but also open for variation and innovation. 
 
Secondly, while most “classic” models of technology adoption under uncertainty predict that risk 
aversion delays adoption (Stoneman, 1981), the results of Tsur et al. (1990) indicate that risk 
aversion positively affects adoption. This seemingly counterintuitive result is explained by the fact 
that although mean profit at time t is negative, compensation occurs in future periods as a result of 
the decline in future risks which results from the learning process. Therefore, the higher the risk 
aversion, the greater is the appreciation of these future declines in risk. If the current mean profit is 
positive, risk aversion leads the decision maker to diversify in order to reduce undesired income risk. 
A similar approach to this concept focusing on financial innovation is described in (Persons and 
Warther, 1997).The important difference between the former models and the latter is that, in those 
models, the adopting firm captures the future benefits of the information generated by adoption i.e.  
adoption in their model produces an informational externality because other firms benefit from the 
information generated when a firm chooses to adopt. Lastly, looking at risk and its effect on diffusion 
from a network perspective, complex models of risk-sharing networks, suggesting that independent 
of individual risk attitude structural positions may explain variance in risk exposure, emergent risk-
sharing networks (underlying e.g., alliance networks) can potentially change adoption behavior 
among agents (Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007; Bloch et al., 2008). To summarize, individual risk 
averseness may have positive implications for the speed of adoption of technology or business 
practices. Nevertheless, incorporating complexity to this concept – in terms of information and risk-
sharing among many agents - may deliver ambigious results.  
Thirdly, we next look at the theoretical and empirical literature on diffusion in networks, and 
strategic alliances in particular – mostly outside the scientific domain of finance and banking - and 
respective adoption and learning environment implications for our concept. As mentioned earlier in 
the introduction, diffusion in fixed inter-firm or interpersonal networks offers an alternative 
structural approach to understanding patterns and drivers of adoptioniv. In the extended version of 
the “classic” two-step flow model put into an innovation perspective (Rogers, 1995) it is argued that 
firms or individuals within a network pass from i) knowledge of innovation, ii) to persuasion, iii) to a 
decision to adopt or reject an innovation, iv) to implementation, and then, v) to confirmation of this 
decision. Hence, in decision process whether or not to adopt an innovation depends mainly on the 
communicated experience of others much like themselves who have already adopted. In the network 
context, Valente (1995) succeeds in separating individuals (and their characteristics) who do not 
adopt - even though being exposed to early adopting peers - from others that are late adopters 
because not being exposed. This means that exposure – however we will define - may not be 
associated with adoption for everyone, but may be most influential during middle stages of diffusion, 
when awareness and uncertainty about its relative advantage are both high (Carley, 2001). From a 
social learning perspective the focus of diffusion studies and business model adoption is on learning 
 6 
 
by means of observational modeling (Bandura, 1977) - whereas the observer’s behavior is not exactly 
the same as the bank’s or a peer group’s model, but rather a mimicry of the underlying business 
model. Adoption behavior in networks, hence, lends itself to sociological theories of isomorphic 
institutional change (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) as well as the board interlocks literature and 
related adoption of organizational structures (Palmer et al., 1993). Nevertheless, the economic 
debate on social learning rather focuses on heterogeneous actor characteristics, among others, risk 
aversion, discount rates and the amount of information that is available for each of the parties 
involved. There is considerable empirical evidence that learning and accumulating information on 
experience of others linked in networks does in fact occur (Young, 2002; Kapur, 1995). In the network 
case of strategic alliances (Kraatz, 1998; Davis, 1991; Kogut, 2000) these are (sets of) firm-subjective 
evaluations of an innovative business model or strategy likely to be transmitted by opinion leaders 
and early adopters among banking institutions via strategic and contracted relationships. In this 
sense, we are neglecting uncertainty and risk associated with the formation of an alliance and the 
selection problem in the first place which maybe equally structural in nature. However, as (Greve, 
1995) argues, the effect of social influence on diffusion may be moderated by other factors such as 
firm size, organizational structures and the level of competition among network members. Another 
example of learning mechanisms and the likely effect on innovation performance in alliance 
networks is Powell et al. (1996) suggesting that collaborations among biotechnology firms form inter-
organizational learning cycles in the following manner: Because information is dispersed among 
organizations and is the source of competitive advantage, in this particular industry, R&D 
collaborations provide firms with experience managing ties and access to more diverse sources of 
information which in turn increase firms’ centrality and their subsequent ties. To summarize, social 
influence or learning may influence the adoption of innovation in networks, most likely depending on 
the diffusion stage of the overall system and as far as adoption is seen as a process itself. Diffusion 
studies, in general, seek to explain homogeneity in firm attributes, beliefs or business practices, also 
as a function of social ties. From a structuralist’s convergence perspective, the mechanisms 
generating similarity between two organizations have to do with sharing the same environments or 
recognition of each other as appropriate role models. In opposition, from a contagion standpoint, 
ties are perceived as conduits or roads along which information or resources flow. On the one hand, 
seen from the point of view of the group as a whole, firms are likely mutually influencing and 
informing each other in a process that creates increasing homogeneity within structural subgroups. 
On the other hand, from the point of view of a single bank, the adoption of a practice is determined 
by the proportion of nodes surrounding the business that have adopted, while the timing of adoption 
is a function of the lengths of paths connecting the bank to other adoptees (Borgatti and Foster, 
2003). From the micro view of the individual banking institution this leads us to state that, controlling 
for risk attitude, firm size and embeddedness of banking institutions, 
 
Hypothesis I 
 
A high (low) share of adopters among peer banks increases (decreases) the bank-specific likelihood of 
adoption of network agents. 
 
However, we also expect aggregate, system level diffusion feedback on micro level decisions to adopt 
among networked and non-networked institutions within and across country-boarders, stemming 
from the integrative (market) function of the alliance network and agents co-existing in similar or 
potentially converging regulatory and competitive environments. In other words, this implies that 
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adoption behavior across actor groups within a national banking (sub)system is likely to influence 
and will be influenced by alternate financial systems across country-boarders (at the extreme, in a 
system of global scale), both changing individual decision-making towards adoption. Hence, we argue 
that,  
 
Hypothesis II 
 
A high (low) share of adopters among peer national banking systems increases (decreases) the bank-
specific likelihood of adoption of national agents within and outside the network, directly and 
indirectly, respectively. 
 
 
Fourthly, in contrast to the abundance of empirical work on innovation e.g. in manufacturing or 
agriculture, there are relatively little quantitative sector-specific studies of financial innovation and 
diffusion of financial innovation (Frame and White, 2004) even though some work by established 
innovation scholars in the field of indicator development and design with the objective to deliver 
new insights on the sources of innovation and characteristics of innovators exists (Lerner, 2002; 
2006). Most of the literature on adoption behavior of banks deals with the decision to incorporate 
underlying “physical” technologies in banking operations originating in the area of 
telecommunications and data processing (Sullivan, 2000, or the ATM case by Saloner and Sheperd, 
1995, mentioned earlier). Nevertheless, a small number of supply-side studies (e.g., Akhavein et al., 
2005) also analyze the diffusion of new products or new services, process or organizational 
innovation directly stemming from and diffusing via financial intermediaries (such as banks, 
insurance companies, etc.) and via financial facilitators (such as stock brokers, market makers or 
financial advisors, etc.).  As a first result from both strands of this literature, larger or relatively more 
profitable banking institutions are generally more likely to be adopters than smaller or less profitable 
institutions, respectively. Similarly, explanatory variables indicating network externality effects such 
as number of a bank’s branches or the extent of customer-user relations may trigger a positive and 
faster decision on adoption. One of the essays maybe closest to our work both methodologically as 
well as from its content is by Molyneux and Shamroukh (1996), who introduce exogenous factors 
with a focus on regulatory as well as demand changes and their respective effect on diffusion 
patterns in the context of junk bonds underwriting and note issuance facilities (NFI) underwriting. 
They find a significant role of these exogenous factors for the former, while NFI seemed largely 
dependent on bandwagon effects from competing institutions. In our context, this may be seen as 
first but limited evidence on, on the one hand, a potential peer effect of market (and, hence, 
potentially network) structure on adoption behavior. On the other hand, Molyneux and Shamroukh’s 
work, imply that regulatory effort (in terms of expanding severity) in some specific innovation 
context seems to facilitate diffusion and most likely induces evasive innovative behavior of financial 
institutions. As mentioned before (Persons and Warther, 1997) present a simple model of the 
adoption of financial innovations that reproduces the boom and bust patterns, showing that even 
though all information is public and all participants are rational, apparently irrational behavior 
emerges in equilibrium. When firms will pass up an innovation today, then they are likely to adopt 
the next period after receiving unfavorable information about the innovation. In addition, on an 
average, the model implies that the last firms to adopt an innovation will lose money, while the end 
of an innovation wave is completely unpredictable. To summarize, there seems to be only very little 
theoretical and eventually weak empirical evidence on diffusion and adoption patterns of innovation 
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in the financial sector while there is no (to the best of our knowledge) explicit evidence on diffusion 
in financial networks. 
Fifthly, and lastly, with respect to regulation and innovation in the financial sector, regulatory effort 
may address specific types of financial institutions or sub-segments of the financial sector, as well as 
it may comprehend various forms of regulation including e.g. safety-and-soundness, insurance 
/safety or information regulation. White (2000) suggests that, ideally, with imperfections being 
present in regulatory processes, as well as in market processes, there are no assurances of purity for 
motives in regulation nor of efficiency of outcomes. All judgments about the necessity for and 
efficacy of regulation, in his view, should have an empirical basis and cannot be settled solely by a 
priori reasoning about the imperfections of markets or of governments. In the very same paper, 
published almost ten years ago, he reveals himself as being a thoughtful advocate of strengthening 
regulation in finance - and highly prophetic in the light of the current crisis and its policy response, as 
 
“specifically, the safety-and-soundness scrutiny of bank regulators should be strengthened in 
a period of rapid innovation and heightened competitive pressures, because the owners and 
managers of faltering banks may be tempted to take "shoot-the-moon" risks at the expense 
of depositors (or deposit insurers). [Footnote by the author: The incentives for this risk-increasing strategy 
arise because, in a limited liability legal environment, the owners of the bank receive all of the upside gains from 
risk-taking but are limited in their liability for losses (which are borne by the liability holders, such as depositors or 
the deposit insurer that stands in their shoes)]. Primary among the improved safety-and-soundness 
regulatory instruments should be improved capital standards, including better ways of 
measuring capital (i.e., the employment of a market value accounting framework) and of 
measuring risks (e.g., financial stress tests).” White (2000, pp. 31)  
 
Focusing on specific forms of regulation, Demirgüc-Kunt et al. (2005) point out that at present almost 
all country have an implicit deposit insurance scheme in place since governments get pressed for 
relief at the outbreak of large systemic banking distress. Where an explicit insurance  relying on 
central bank law, banking laws or constitutional rights and so on, defining beginning date, coverage 
limits, how (if any) they are going to funded and regulation how bank failure is resolved, does not 
exist, countries most likely have implicit insurance schemes. According to economic theory, while 
deposit insurance may increase bank stability by reducing self-fulfilling or information-driven 
depositor runs, it may decrease bank stability by encouraging risk-taking and moral hazard behavior 
on the part of banks (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Allen and Gale, 1998). Empirically, Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Detragiache‘s cross-country study (2002) finds that explicit deposit insurance tends to be 
detrimental to bank stability, the more so where bank interest rates have been deregulated and 
where the institutional environment is weak. They interpret the latter result to mean that, where 
institutions are good it is more likely that an effective system of prudential regulation and 
supervision is in place to offset the lack of market discipline created by deposit insurance and create 
financial instability (Cull et al., 2005; Chernykh and Cole, 2010). In addition, the adverse impact of 
deposit insurance on bank stability tends to be stronger the more extensive is the coverage offered 
to depositors. Nevertheless, other international evidence suggests that countries establishing deposit 
insurance and that enforce strict bank capital adequacy requirements experience a smaller output 
cost of crises (Angkinand, 2009). Feroandez and Gonźalez (2005), addressing beneficial and 
interacting regulatory effects, find that the adverse impact from insurance schemes on risk taking can 
be reduced by enhancing the effectiveness of accounting and auditing systems. To summarize, even 
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though not explicitly discussed in this branch of the literature at present, we may hypothesize 
whether we would expect a positive moderating mechanism stemming from regulatory efforts and 
related moral hazard behavior on risk-bearing willingness in adoption patterns within financial 
networks. In other words, the early introduction and scope of regulatory on deposit insurance 
schemes as well as accounting and auditing rules most likely increases the speed of diffusion of such 
risk-associated practices on bank and aggregate country levels. 
 
Hypothesis III 
 
The more (less) strict and precocious national financial regulatory effort the higher (lower) the 
country-specific likelihood of adoption of its agents. 
 
 
Sample description 
In this section, we will start off with a short description of data sources and matching approach. Next, 
we will present the identification strategy and design for indicators on adoption and on network 
characteristics. Lastly, we will illustrate the network of strategic alliances and summarize the sample 
by giving descriptive statistics on the panel variables we use in the analytical sections following this 
one. 
Data sources. 
Our sample contains micro-level company account data of banks and financial institutions (both 
public and private) worldwide coming from BankScope database in the time period from 1995 to 
2008. This data comprehends information on ownership and ratings data as well as financial 
statements of institutions among more than 22.000 entities. A second source of information on 
banks and financial institutions is THOMPSON’s SDC database and its module on strategic alliances 
and joint venturesv including bilateral and collateral inter-firm relations.  Using ticker information 
from BankScope and the SDC database – after uniquely matching sources- we are able to identify a 
subset of banks and financial institutions networked in strategic alliances of more than 300 
companies.  In this process we excluded, on the one hand, fully public entities such as central banks, 
and, on the other hand, parties in alliances contracting on a specific time frame. The latter only 
accounts for approximately 4% of the overall sample of networked entities in alliances. In addition, 
the majority of these cases contains information on periods of contracting-time that seems rather 
implausible, e.g., stating duration of 50 years or explicitly containing potentially false or misleading 
information, zero or negative values. Furthermore, we excluded cases where all or some entities 
involved did not disclose their identity in the database. Interestingly, the remaining 96% of alliances 
in the sample were contracted on an open basis i.e. having no specific end date. 
On country level, we collected information from OECD and World Bank databases. OECD income 
statement and balance sheet data contains among other fairly new financial (soundness) indicators 
on capital adequacy analysis, i.e. more specifically annual regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets 
according to European Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) core accounting 
guidelines, among 33 member countries, accession / dialogue candidates and several other 
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countries. Furthermore, the data also includes annual information on country’s interest rate levels as 
well as total financial assets / size of consolidated national investment funds. In addition, we 
extended the sample with data from the World Bank’s panel on national deposit insurance regulation 
among more than 180 member countries. WB’s country panel comprehends information on quality 
e.g., in terms of coverage amounts, enforcement and coinsurance requirements, and enactment or 
timing of such regulatory effort. 
Indicators of adoption behavior. 
IMF describes the change of the generic banking business model as well as it observes significant 
changes in international capital market, as 
“banking systems in the major countries have gone through a process of disintermediation—
that is, a greater share of financial intermediation is now taking place through tradable 
securities (rather than bank loans and deposits). Both financial and nonfinancial entities, as 
well as savers and investors, have played key roles in, and benefited from, this 
transformation. Banks have increasingly moved financial risks (especially credit risks) off their 
balance sheets and into securities markets—for example, by pooling and converting assets 
into tradable securities and entering into interest rate swaps and other derivatives 
transactions—in response both to regulatory incentives such as capital requirements and to 
internal incentives to improve risk-adjusted returns on capital for shareholders and to be 
more competitive” (Häusler, 2008). 
This leads us to consider two types of indicators for bank-level adoption of the non-traditional model 
as exemplified elsewhere in the literature (Vitols, 2009): i) the annual changes in the share of interest 
income on loans to operating income (memo), and, inversely, ii) the annual changes in the share of 
non-interest income to gross revenues. Supposingly, the former is a good indicator for the adoption 
of this model as being the percentage of income derived from interest (versus other sources of 
income such as trading profits, fees and commissions, etc.), while the latter indicator is just the 
inverse of the former and, hence, should most likely deliver identical or at least similar implications. 
A major difficulty in terms of analyzing adoption behavior of banking and financial institutions is to 
set up a resilient concept of what determines a (significant) change of banking business behavior. 
However we will define the non-traditional business model of banking a definition of behavioral 
change is likely to identify either too many or too little adopters at time t in the population 
depending on the average amount of time such a change is assumed to require as well as the 
parameter treshold that will qualify to adoption, not withstanding cyclical effects of the overall 
financial system. To tackle at least some of these problems, we apply transition probability matrizes 
(TPM) in order to identify relevant probability patterns of travelling of observations across growth 
percentiles and time, as it is done in some of the recent empirical literature on firm growth and 
related growth distributions (Capasso et al., 2009). Tables xy and xy in the appendix show TPMs for 
both indicators. Given critical values of transition probabilities should be significantly higher than .10 
as the literature (Hoel et al., 1987) suggest – one sees that observations generally shift three 
percentiles across the overall panel’s time (starting in 1996 to 2008), if we neglect the boundaries of 
the distribution and their extreme mobility behavior. Acknowledging that zero growth occurs within 
the 6th to 7th percentiles in the original distribution, shifting of growth distributions related to the 
share of interest income from loans imply a general negative reallocation effort of these interest 
income sources at a decreasing speed across time. With respect to non-interest income where zero 
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growth occurs in the 3rd to 4th percentiles observations exhibit either positive or negative growth 
rates. In any case, given observations transition with monotonicity to higher or lower, respectively, 
percentiles, it will still suffice the above threshold definitions of adoption. Furthermore, we can 
control for a general shifting of the overall population of growth rates at each time t, i.e. we abstract 
from cyclical effects, as individual mobility of an observation references the distribution in t+1. 
Anyhow, this leaves us with the issue of configuring the average implementation time in the context 
of the adoption-process. Hence, we proceed pragmatically with the latter by testing different 
specifications of time in the analytical sections following this one, i.e. implementation requiring two 
consecutive periods in order to transition 3 growth percentilesvi. 
 
Network indicators. 
As dealing with patterns of diffusion potentially stemming from networked agents, we are naturally 
interested in the quality and intensity of signals being sent from peer agents and the overall network. 
Following earlier work from Valente (2005), we assume that a firm’s network exposure at time t is 
the proportion or number of adopters (as defined in the last paragraph) in each firm’s network 
providing information, persuasion and influence with regard to the non-traditional business model. 
More formally, network exposure Ei is, Ei=∑ (wij yi) / ∑ (wi), where w is the inter-firm network weight 
matrix and y is the vector of adoptions. As we argued above and notwithstanding issues of group 
definition, we focus our analysis on the group of immediate neighbors in the undirected network of 
strategic alliances i.e. direct links among agents. Furthermore, we introduce a social learning 
perspective to contagion serving as an additional signal of profitability at t+1 by studying median pre-
tax profits of banks and financial institutions among neighbors within these groups. In order to 
capture some of the potential exposure effects of indirect links and, hence, the overall network 
structure, we integrate a commonly used measure for network embbededness or centrality of the 
agent i.e. the degree (exemplarily, table xy in the appendix ranks the top 30 financial agents and their 
country affiliation using degrees based on total stock of alliances). It is defined, more technically, as 
the number of edges incident to the node or vertex, with loops counted twice, and basically counts 
the number of ties to all other actors in the network. In this way, the degree may partially be 
associated with intensity of overall adoption signals perceived while shares of surrounding adopters 
and average profitability may to some extent account for quality. At a second stage of the analysis 
that focuses on aggregate networks among countries emerging from patterns between national 
groups of agents, we conduct similar measurement on mean adoption rates among peer countries. 
Here, individual banks and financial institutions in a specific country are exposed to a social 
international norm arising within its transnational context. Figure xy exemplarily illustrates the 
undirected networks among countries using the total stock of strategic alliances from 1995 to 2008, 
as well as the original network in 1995. It can be seen that the network has considerably grown in 
terms of new countries involved and, most likely, in terms of its density. Analogously to the micro-
level analysis, we account for embeddedness of the agent’s country in global financial markets by its 
degree. 
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Figure xy. network evolution on country level: comparing country level networks based on (1) total 
stock for overall period (1995 – 2008) and, (2) early-stage total stock for the period (1995 – 1998) 
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Descriptives. 
At this stage, we have identified and designed indicators on adoption and related network exposure 
and proceed with preliminary descriptive statistics on the two sample populations (see Fig. xy), also 
including regulatory indicators as well as measures of diffusion variance between country groups, the 
latter being an issue that we will discuss in the following section. A first sample is involving 
observations that are part of the network of strategic alliances evolving across 1995 to 2008; the 
other also comprehends non-networked as well as networked observations among banks and 
financial institutions worldwide. From a first look at both samples, on an average, we find that the 
network subsample involves larger corporate entities (having higher amounts of total assets) and a 
greater share of adopters, while countries of networked agents are less central (having a lower 
degree) with reference to the global country level network. Furthermore, figure xy in the appendix 
offers an alternative view on some of the variables of interest studying correlations in the overall 
sample. Lastly, figure xy presents patterns of diffusion among networked and non-networked agents. 
Here, we find first evidence on the growth of the network overcompensating adoption levels in early 
years of observation within the network, i.e. more banks entering the network, simultaneously 
increasing densities of non-adopters and adopters. 
table. xy summary statistics for overall sample of (non-) networked observations and subsample of 
networked observations 
 overall sample of (non-) networked observations subsample of networked observations 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
           
adoption based on loan interest income share 361312 .0813646 .2733946 0 1 3020 .1211921 .3264044 0 1 
adoption based on non-interest income share 361312 .147482 .3545862 0 1 3020 .3188742 .4661173 0 1 
loan interest income to income 57945 2.121.302 407.021 -1.490.761 6.697.118 957 1.374.161 1.146.333 -1.152.353 2.080.118 
non-interest income to revenue 93000 3.038.146 3.930.401 -964 995.73 1948 3.825.171 3.203.982 -466.7 486.2 
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total assets 101651 1.09e+07 8.51e+07 22 3.81e+09 1713 1.50e+08 3.72e+08 6606 3.81e+09 
           
mean pre-profit (peer banks) 694 1957219 5143249 -4.83e+07 3.65e+07 694 1957219 5143249 -4.83e+07 3.65e+07 
mean adopters (peer banks) based on loan interest income share 918 .1990839 .3480079 0 1 918 .1990839 .3480079 0 1 
mean adopters (peer banks) based on non-interest income share 918 .494253 .4457817 0 1 918 .494253 .4457817 0 1 
degree(bank level) 2350 .7548936 2.025.888 0 14 2338 .7463644 2.009.881 0 14 
degree(country level) 256753 2.442.027 1.744.116 1 50 2529 1.726.097 1.404.217 1 50 
mean pre-profit (country group) 256036 266846.3 592425.4 -1279168 6957256 2489 280788.9 503933.5 -1279168 6957256 
mean adopters (country group) based on non-interest income share 256753 .1813381 .1721004 0 .9166667 2529 .2381716 .1788681 0 .7607656 
mean adopters (country group) based on loan interest income share 256753 .0850491 .1019636 0 .7 2529 .1150311 .1085664 0 .7 
           
coverage deposit rate / capital ratio 145517 83.358 3.535.966 .1103918 1.955.029 758 618.213 4.103.357 .1103918 2.301.235 
enactment pre1990 361333 .7344416 .4416307 0 1 3020 .5864238 .4925558 0 1 
reg.cap.to risk weight.ass. 32064 1.324.197 245.412 2.434 25.34 356 1.309.082 2.605.127 8.839 25.34 
 
 
 
Figure xy : adoption and non-adoption density curves for diffusion among networked and non-
networked agents, 
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History event analysis 
Empirical strategy. 
In order to test for the hypotheses related to the adoption decisions we use a Cox proportional 
hazard model that estimates the probability of survival, i.e. probability of not adopting, past time t. It 
has the property that it leaves the baseline hazard unparameterized h0(t), i.e. there is no assumption 
about the shape of the hazard over time. This semi-parametric model, with coefficients ß1,..,ßk and 
respective variables x1,..,xk , the hazard at time t is of the general form 
 
h(t|x) = h0(t) exp ( ß1 x1 + … + ßk xk ) . 
Nevertheless, as we expect observed explanatory variables not to explain all the variability in the 
observed time to event, we introduce a more complex version of Cox’s original model with shared 
Gamma frailty (Clayton, 1978). Here, frailty αi may be caused by unobserved relevant risk factors 
from unexplained heterogeneity that is shared among individual observations j, with j = 1,…,ni , i.e. 
banks or financial institutions forming a group within a specific country i, with i = 1,…,n . Hence, we 
define the model with shared frailty, as 
h(t|x) = h0(t) αi exp ( ß1 xij + … + ßk xij ) , 
with E(αi) = 1 and V(αi) = θ. 
For θi = log αi, the hazard can be rewritten as, 
h(t|x) = h0(t) αi exp ( ß1 xij + … + ßk xij + θi) . 
Basically, this model will serve us as a vehicle of multilevel analysis within the context of a regular Cox 
regression model adjusting for and estimating within-group correlations, i.e. log country frailty 
effects θi (Guo and Rodriguez, 1992) In order to secure the validity of the model assumptions made, 
namely on proportional hazard and gamma distribution of α, we run several tests to qualify our 
approachesvii, e.g., among others, Weibull testing. Furthermore, we partially can control for problems 
of endogeneity by lagging variables that account for any structural features presumably influencing 
agent behavior in t+1, i.e. all variables serving as network indicators.  
In the next section, we will briefly discuss our findings on network exposure and regulation and their 
potential effect on patterns of diffusion and adoption, each based on estimations of: i) standard Cox 
regressions, moving on to ii) shared frailty models, i.e. controlling for country clusters. 
 
Analysis results on network exposure. 
As suggested above, survival of agents in the context of non-traditional business model diffusion 
refers to agents that do not adopt past time t whereas adoption is associated with the hazard 
pattern. We proceed with arranging and estimating several (standard and shared frailty) Cox model 
specifications, for different types of indicators of regulation (dependent variables) and  adoption 
(explanatory variable) [for noninterest income, models  1-4, and for loan interest income, models 5-8 
in the appendix], and on different levels of the analysis [on micro level, models 9-10 in the appendix].   
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Firstly, let us consider the hazard ratios associated with bank-specific characteristics. While there is 
weak or no significant evidence on the effect on adoption from risk attitude as proxied by the level of 
noninterest income and loan interest income at time t, there seems to be excess risk ranging from 7 
to 10% related to firm size as measured by log total assets, at the 1% level in any specification, 
including specifications where we control for between-group effects. Even though the traditional 
literature on diffusion of innovative practices mostly suggests that small rather than larger 
corporations have the organizational flexibility to adopt (Damanpour, 1992), the estimated hazard 
ratio may be partially explained by larger corporations operating and competing on global financial 
markets and, thus, being informed and more prone to adopt profitable business models. Interestingly 
as opposing the first impression from diffusion distributions above, in the multivariate analysis 
context, we do find a weak (negative) or no significant direct effect from network membership. The 
former is estimated within the model specification based on the adoption criteria of noninterest 
income activities and regulatory deposit insurance coverage, reducing risk exposure by 
approximately half. One reason that can explain a risk reduction is that a number of networked firms 
is likely to have adopted before the period at risk, i.e. before 1998. Alternatively, variance in results 
may stem from the network subsample being relatively small in comparison to the overall sample. 
 
Secondly, with respect to the set of indicators on network exposure, for models using our 
noninterest income adoption definition [1-4 and 9] our results imply that there is indeed a strong 
influencing effect from the share of direct-tied adopters, both, for peer effects among banks and 
among related countries. This content-related effect gets even more pronounced when we control 
for country groups, while the intensity of such signals as proxied by degree in most cases is not 
significant and can, thus, be neglected. If having any effect, we estimate a positive hazard ratio for 
the latter, i.e. increasing the probability of adoption relative to agents with lower degrees.  However, 
for models using our income from loan interest income adoption definition [5-8 and 10] we have 
some countervailing evidence. Rather than a strong excess risk we find in most of these specifications 
a radical reduction of risk stemming from the share of surrounding adopters. This shift changing the 
direction of the peer effect astonishes, we argue that it can be justified by the difference in 
explanatory variables themselves. Both indicators are likely to measure slightly different aspects of 
the non-traditional business model, having a relatively weak correlation (see table xy). If we consider 
now how these signals are processed by banks and financial institutions in all model specifications, 
we do not find any or convincing evidence on social learning. Neither the information of past mean / 
median profit in the peer group at time t-1, nor the interaction between profitability and shares of 
adoption in t seem to be relevant risk factors. To summarize, this leaves us with mixed but, 
nevertheless, convincing overall evidence qualifying hypothesis I and II on network exposure and its 
effect on adoption.  More precisely, exposure to peers influences the risk adoption rather than it 
creates a learning environment for agents in our specific banking context, while the role of 
information transmission in terms of intensity is less important.   
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Table xy. Standard and shared fraility model cox regressions using overall sample of non- and 
networked banks and financial institutions, noninterest income indicator, both types of regulatory 
effort, models 1-4 
 
 
Regulatory effort. 
Firstly, as the theoretical discussion on Hypothesis III summarizes we expect financial regulation to 
have a net positive impact on the diffusion of the business model as being associated with extensive 
moral hazard behavior. Nevertheless, we find that this effect depends on the type of regulatory 
effort. For model specifications having timing and coverage of deposit insurance as an explanatory 
factor, and, however we define adoption criteria, there is a strong excess risk effect from strictness 
and early issuance of this regulation type.  While the relative effect for strictness is weaker than for 
early enactment across models, controlling for theta moderates the latter effect. Interestingly, when 
we look at the interaction term, it is advised to regulate both ways, early and strict. This may reduce 
the risk of adopting non-traditional business models by 2 to 17%, depending on the specific model 
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we apply. Specific results on early adoption of regulation and related to the interaction term 
coincidence with past studies on regulatory convergence across the globe with respect to deposit 
insurance as well as statements on particular WB data properties (Demirgüc-Kunt et al., 2005). They 
argue that early and strictly regulating countries have been more likely to put in place other and 
additional regulation more directly addressing risk-associated business practices, e.g., supervision of 
hedge funds at the turn of the century. One example of such regulatory packagesviii includes the 
introduction of specific safety-and-soundness regulation i.e. regulatory capital to risk-weighted 
assets accounting, often in addition to deposit insurance. With respect for the former type of 
regulation our estimations suggest that there is either no significant effect in the case of noninterest 
income adoption or there is a reduction of risk from such regulation (which in some ways mimics 
some of the size effects we measured) in the case of loan income adoption. However, this effect 
loses significance when we integrate country group effects into the specifications which nicely lead 
us to discuss frailty effects for country groups. 
Secondly, we find in the θ estimates an implication that within-group effects for countries matter for 
diffusion patterns. Independent of regulatory type and adoption criteria we apply, association or 
clustering parameters θ are significant on a 1 % level and positive. In other words, the conditional 
hazard effect theta for a bank or financial institutions suggest that knowledge of another bank’s 
adoption in the same country, in the noninterest income (loan interest income) case, would actually 
increase the probability of adoption by 2.8 up to 25 % (107 up to 128 %). Furthermore, such within-
country-group effects are relatively stronger for regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets accounting 
than for deposit insurance regulation. Table xy in the appendix displays and ranks specific frailties for 
countries based on our non-interest income indicator. Even though these should be interpreted with 
care given the particular context they arise, rankings suggest that controlling for all other aspects 
explaining adoption some economies seem to be more subject to conditional risk than others, e.g., 
on an average this holds for emerging more than industrialized economies with a few exceptions.    
 
Discussion and implications for future studies 
Even though the empirical results in the last section deliver interesting insights on the historical case, 
there is some room to improve the specific design of some of its indicators. To begin with, we do not 
exactly measure the content and use of specific financial innovation, i.e. specific financial 
instruments, but (due to data restrictions) but linger with the measurement of generic aspects of a 
business model which does only to some extent allow to establish the functions we have associated 
with alliance networks. Furthermore, some types of innovations may have been adopted more 
frequently or may have imputed different results from those we obtained. 
 
Another issue is how we modeled and measured the indicator on profitability among peer agents in 
the learning process. Firstly, pre-profits among many other indicators of profitability could have been 
measured not on an absolute basis but using growth rates and accounting for medium-term variance 
in profitability. Similarly, agents in learning environments may require a longer period of observation 
before responding and fully believing peer information. So, testing for different specifications of time 
lags might put the procedural part of the adoption decision on more reliable empirical ground.  
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Lastly, future work might also consider investigation related to the variance in crisis outcomes in 
most recent years as well as earlier financial crisis, i.e. looking at loss distributions, depending on 
factors such as early or late adoption of non-traditional banking on bank and country levels, or the 
potential loss reducing effects of regulation. In this same line of reasoning, a longer and continuous 
development of the panel data might allow to assess the expected effects stemming from policy 
responses to the recent crisis. 
 
Conclusion 
Direct and, more prominently, indirect alliance network exposure to peer banks or countries 
influences the risk adoption rather than it creates a learning environment for agents in our specific 
banking context, while the role of information transmission in terms of intensity is less important. 
Furthermore, we find reliable evidence that regulation moderates the diffusion of new banking 
practices whereas the direction of the effect on adoption will most likely depend on the particular 
type of regulation issued. Similarly, our results suggest that national effort towards financial 
regulation may be fully legitimized due to country-specific frailty levels i.e. moderating domino 
effects in national patterns of diffusion. So, even though supranational, regulatory harmonization 
and supervision has been discussed critically in the existing literature (White, 2000)ix, network 
exposure effects as measured may be something that should be accounted for by policymakers – as 
they lead to a systemic effect on adoption – i.e. any (first-mover) national regulation is likely 
feedback on the risk associated with diffusion of adverse business practices elsewhere in the world, 
making national regulation - at the extreme, and given systemicness – a “classic” public good 
problem on global scale. In any case, alliance networks in the financial sector spanning across 
countries may serve as an indicator for systemicness among countries and may support forecasting 
supranational interdependencies and structures in global finance. 
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Appendix 
 
Table xy. Transition probability matrix for growth rates using noninterest income to total revenue 
indicator 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 14,76 9,32 5,93 5,03 4,47 4,71 5,38 7,36 12,40 30,64 
2 8,59 10,07 9,41 8,91 8,41 9,17 10,99 11,84 12,84 9,76 
3 5,74 7,74 11,05 11,36 11,68 11,95 12,49 11,58 10,63 5,78 
4 4,30 7,33 10,36 12,30 13,58 13,19 13,43 11,56 8,68 5,25 
5 3,73 6,48 10,36 12,56 13,68 14,95 13,22 11,80 8,63 4,59 
6 3,69 7,31 9,92 13,28 12,95 16,09 13,00 10,91 8,68 4,17 
7 4,05 8,90 10,87 13,55 13,07 11,94 12,70 11,65 8,63 4,64 
8 6,34 11,43 13,79 11,77 10,93 10,04 10,73 9,99 9,30 5,68 
9 11,63 17,71 13,68 9,70 7,69 6,45 7,44 8,16 9,21 8,35 
10 34,70 14,48 6,80 4,74 3,55 3,71 4,38 5,07 8,35 14,22 
 
Table xy. Transition probability matrix for growth rates using loan interest income to total income 
indicator 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 16,11 10,07 7,60 6,81 5,54 6,81 7,27 7,96 9,53 22,29 
2 4,98 8,92 9,11 8,95 11,60 12,40 10,98 10,58 11,60 10,88 
3 3,63 7,30 9,80 12,09 12,76 12,71 11,31 11,74 11,09 7,57 
4 2,82 6,82 10,57 11,04 12,41 12,22 13,34 13,15 10,98 6,66 
5 3,30 7,74 9,64 10,90 13,05 12,99 11,71 12,67 12,12 5,88 
6 2,61 9,51 9,40 10,57 12,20 12,07 13,02 13,26 11,90 5,46 
7 3,76 10,28 10,25 11,01 11,39 11,63 12,18 12,72 10,36 6,41 
8 4,36 9,11 12,15 11,47 10,30 11,55 12,58 11,33 9,96 7,19 
9 9,33 13,02 11,73 11,18 11,12 9,18 9,15 7,65 8,34 9,31 
10 43,18 13,26 6,62 5,06 4,01 2,99 3,26 2,85 4,90 13,88 
 
Table xy. Ranking of top 30 financial agents in the network and respective country affiliation, based 
on degree measures on agent level and total stock of alliances (1995 – 2008) 
Institution name Country affil. degree 
Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation JP 14 
UFJ Bank Ltd JP 13 
Bank of Tokyo JP 11 
Sumitomo Trust & Banking Company Ltd JP 10 
Bank of Yokohama, Ltd JP 10 
American Express Company US 9 
Acom Co, Ltd JP 9 
Dai-Ichi Kangyo Bank Ltd JP 8 
Shinsei Bank Limited JP 8 
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Tokai Bank Ltd. JP 7 
Mizuho Trust & Banking Co., Ltd JP 7 
Mitsubishi UFJ Trust and Banking Corporation JP 5 
Royal Bank of Canada RBC CAN 5 
Standard Chartered Plc UK 4 
Bank of America Corporation US 4 
Westpac Banking Corporation AU 4 
Australia and New Zealand Banking Group AU 4 
Asahi Bank Ltd JP 4 
Chuo Mitsui Trust & Banking Co Ltd JP 4 
Komercijalna Banka A.D. Skopje MAC 4 
Machhapuchchhre Bank Ltd NP 3 
JP Morgan Chase & Co. US 3 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia AU 3 
ING Groep NV NE 3 
Bank of Montreal-Banque de Montreal CAN 3 
National Australia Bank Limited CAN 3 
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce CIBC CAN 3 
UFJ Trust Bank Ltd JP 3 
US Bancorp US 3 
ABSA Group Ltd SA 3 
 
Table xy correlations among var.s, overall sample of (non-) networked observations (n=2845) 
 adoption 
based on loan 
interest 
income share 
adoption 
based on non-
interest 
income share 
loan 
interest 
income to 
income 
non-
interest 
income to 
revenue 
Tot
ala
sse
ts       
 
degree
(count
ry 
level) 
mean pre-
profit 
(country 
group) 
mean adopters 
(country group) based 
on non-interest 
income share 
mean adopters 
(country group) based 
on loan interest 
income share 
coverage 
deposit 
rate / 
capital ratio 
enact
ment 
pre19
90 
            
adoption based on 
loan interest income 
share 
1           
adoption based on 
non-interest income 
share 
0.4663 1          
loan interest income 
to income 
-0.0086 0.0497 1         
non-interest income 
to revenue 
0.1237 0.0772 -0.0080 1        
total assets 0.0354 -0.0178 -0.0044 0.0427 1       
degree(country level) 0.2508 0.3230 0.0588 -0.0801 0.0
545 
1      
mean pre-profit 
(country group) 
0.3066 0.1552 -0.0207 0.1714 -
0.0
002 
0.0170 1     
mean adopters 
(country group) based 
on non-interest 
income share 
0.4451 0.3932 0.0016 0.0405 0.0
216 
0.4101 0.5858 1    
mean adopters 
(country group) based 
on loan interest 
income share 
0.4250 0.4166 0.0054 0.0022 0.0
199 
0.4400 0.3911 0.9568 1   
coverage deposit rate 
/ capital ratio 
-0.2435 -0.1010 0.0052 -0.2359 0.0
102 
0.2819 -0.6965 -0.4332 -0.2902 1  
enactment pre1990 -0.0239 -0.0706 -0.1199 0.0527 -
0.0
474 
-
0.0958 
0.2173 0.0720 0.0060 -0.0943 1 
reg.cap.to risk 
weight.ass. 
-0.0915 0.0904 -0.0436 -0.1542 -
0.0
279 
0.5196 -0.5463 -0.2487 -0.1213 0.7164 -
0.000
3 
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Table xy. Standard and shared fraility model cox regressions using overall sample of non- and 
networked banks and financial institutions, loan income indicator, both types of regulatory effort, 
models 5-8 
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Table xy cox regressions using network subsample on micro/bank level, noninterest income and loan 
income indicators, models 9 and 10 
 
 
Table xy.  Country ranking based on frailty effects (ranking least frail country first), noninterest 
adoption criteria and each types of regulation 
deposit insurance regulation regulatory capture regulation 
country code frailty effects θ country code frailty effects θ 
    
VE -.1957287 SW -.985311 
US -.1578685 NT -.4926733 
NO -.1323755 SZ -.2803427 
AR -.1255883 SP -.2565324 
BR -.1071345 IT -.2411003 
CA -.0686969 NO -.1533411 
SZ -.0631957 NZ .1649643 
FR -.0371388 SK .3021305 
RU -.0363852 BL .3530522 
SK -.0240919 PL .635167 
NT -.0117106   
GR -.0064645   
SP -.0036154   
MX .0020284   
BA .0239571   
IN .0393897   
IT .0754873   
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DN .1318671   
PL .133943   
WG .1674289   
JP .263378   
Endnotes. 
                                                          
 
i
 Powerful private innovation may generate intense spillover that threatens macroeconomic stability as 
evidenced by the 1987 stock market crash, the Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) and Enron collapses, 
the Internet bubble and finally the subprime crisis. 
ii
 The second network function established bears a weak notion of critical mass or network externality effects, 
in our case for the success and distribution of new financial instruments, as was described earlier by (Saloner 
and Shepard, 1995). Similarly, given new financial instruments e.g., derivate instruments, are exchanged 
mutually this may add the function of risk-sharing (Bramoullé and Kranton, 2007) among banks to alliance 
networks. 
iii
 Interestingly, some authors argue that from a management perspective business model adoption and 
adjustment should ultimately consider the criteria of sustainability (of the model chosen) i.e. a central task is to 
“monitor the risks and uncertainties that could impact the firm’s business model on a permanent basis, which 
requires regular analysis of both the environment and of the organization’s internal drifts” (Demil and Lecocq, 
2010). 
iv
 At the extreme, following Olson’s “logic of collective action” (1965) and the idea of critical mass on system 
level, diffusion in our case may even spur illogical individual adoption behavior, as individual pursuit of banks 
may cause a disadvantaged systemic outcome (e.g., in terms of risk excess) at the collective level. A (constant 
or varying) threshold on individual bank level may offer a different explanatory for adoption - even though 
critical mass and threshold may be potentially interrelated phenomena (Granovetter, 1978; Valente, 1995). 
v
 We accessed both data sources and last updated on August, 31
st
, 2010. The same holds for World bank data 
on countries as well as deposit insurance; the latter data is accessible via 
http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/0,,contentMDK:20699211~pagePK:6421
4825~piPK:64214943~theSitePK:469382,00.html. 
vi
 Estimation results for alternative specifications of these adoption criteria (that yield very similar results) can 
be obtained by the authors upon request. 
vii
 Again, test results can be obtained by the author upon demand. 
viii
 Both variables having a correlation of .71 being one of the reasons that made us run separate regression 
models. 
ix
 As White (2000) puts it, “the gains can come from the harmonization of information regulation (e.g., in 
standardizing accounting frameworks and reporting requirements), so as to reduce the transactions costs of 
both the purveyors and users of financial services that cross national boundaries. Also, harmonization that 
serves as a guise for reducing protectionist barriers or governmental subsidies for financial firms among 
countries can be beneficial. But even the harmonization of information regulation carries the dangers that 
worthwhile local variations may be squelched and/or uniformity may be achieved at wholly inappropriate 
levels. More important are the dangers that international harmonization efforts could become smokescreens 
for international regulatory regimes that are protectionist and anti-competitive; unfortunately, there are 
precedents (in airlines, ocean shipping, and telecommunications) for this type of protectionist international 
regulatory regime to arise.” 
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